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INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND
THE COMMON
GOOD-THE BALANCE:
PRAYER, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, ABORTION
BRENDAN F. BROWN*
In striking the balance between individual freedom and the common
good of society, judges are relying "on ideology or policy preference more
than on legislative intent."' Professor Jude P. Dougherty, President-elect
of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, has declared that
"this is particulary apparent in actions of the United States Supreme
Court where the envisaged effects of a decision are often given more weight
than the intentions of the framers of the Constitution or of the legislators
who passed the law under consideration."' The dominant trend of the
United States judiciary is to begin its reasoning with "liberty" or "free-
dom" as the ultimate moral value in the Franco-American sense of maxi-
mum individual self-assertion, and then to maximize it.
It will be the purpose of this paper to show that "liberty" or "freedom"
is only an instrumental moral value, and that by treating it otherwise, the
courts are damaging the common good of society. I shall follow the philoso-
phy of the objective natural law, mindful of the approaches of other philo-
sophies in this respect, especially the Kantian.
I
The philosophy of an objective natural law prevailed during the form-
ative period of United States political and juridical institutions. A higher
law concept was the fundamental basis of the Declaration of Independence
*Professor Emeritus, Loyola University School of Law; A.B. 1921, LL.B. 1924, Creighton
University; J.U.D., Catholic University, 1927; D.Phil., Oxford University, 1932.
' Memorandum of Jude P. Dougherty to the members of the American Catholic Philosophical
Association, proposing "Philosophy and Civil Law" as the topic for the 1975 Convention of
the Association 1.
2 Id.
I Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HsAv. L. REv.
149, 152 (1928). See generally Kenealy, The Majesty of the Law, 5 LoyoLA L. REv. 101, 105-
106 (1950).
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with its hard core of unchallengeable rights.' The Declaration had a higher
law or objective natural law basis, obviously, because these rights did not
come from the wills of the authors of the Declaration, or from the people,
whom they represented. The authority was divine; it rested upon some-
thing beyond human will.
Since the philosophy of an objective natural law was dominant in the
formative period of United States institutions, it is manifest that its con-
cept of liberty or freedom prevailed. The idea of "liberty" which evolved
during the American Revolution was conceptually different from that of
the subsequent French Revolution. In the French experiment it was
wholly subjective, the total creation of human will, and detached from the
obligation of right reason, as prescribed by the natural law. The word
"liberty" in the phrase "life, liberty, or property" in the fifth amendment
of the United States Constitution meant human dignity, but it was used
because the Constitution was written in the eighteenth century, an age of
struggle for political freedom.
Natural law imposes the duty to respect human dignity as the final
moral value, and additionally, subultimate or instrumental values such as
liberty. Correlated with the right to liberty is the corresponding duty of
restraint where justice to other individuals, the state, and society so re-
quires. The duty is imposed by this higher law in consequence of the
essential nature of man, a reasoning and free-willing entity.,
Freedom of the human will is limited by the natural law in the area
of conduct in the private sphere of morality, as well as in the public area
of law. The coercive power of state law is to be exercised only when the
violation of the moral law results in social injustice.7 Man is not considered
free to act so as to deviate from the fundamental requirements of his
human nature, characterized by certain specific functions and faculties,
although he has the physical power to do so.8
The moral and jural value of legally upholding individual liberty in
its twofold sense-first, of allowing the individual to do what he pleases,
and second, to be protected from unjust compulsion to do what he does
not will to do-lies in the preservation of the integrity of the great human
faculty of will. But this faculty is limited by the other great faculty of
reason, operating on the norm of objective morality.
Natural law philosophy balances individual liberty against the social
or common good, but the relative weights to be given to each in any situa-
See generally Brown, The Natural Law Basis of Juridical Institutions in the Anglo-
American Legal System, 4 CATH. U.L. REv. 81, 82 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
VAN DUZER, CoNTmrION OF THE IDEOLOGUES To FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT 5-7 (1935).
H. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 35 (1947).
See Brown, Natural Law: Dynamic Basis of Law and Morals in the Twentieth Century, 31
Tu AE L. REV. 491 (1957).
' See Ill M. CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH, ch. XI, at 206, ch. XXII, at 215 (G. Sabine and
S. Smith transl. 1929).
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tion must first be ascertained. This is done by determining what effect the
claimed area of liberty, if given legal protection, would have on individual
human dignity. In the balancing process between the individual and so-
ciety, therefore, greater weight is to be given to society, except only when
this would erode the fundamental worth of the individual. Hence, the
precise degree of individual freedom allowable in any given situation is to
be determined by questioning its necessity in terms of the preservation of
essential human dignity.
The protection of essential individual liberty is indispensable for the
common good. However, unrestricted freedom may very well erode human
dignity and impair that good. No person has a right to liberty which inter-
feres, directly or indirectly, with an activity which is essential to the good
of society. Individual freedom is limited by social requirements, which are,
in turn, indispensable for the individual's good.
Therefore, during the formative period, individual liberty was not
weighed against the common good, as it is in the philosophy of Kant, but
in its favor, as in the philosophy of the higher law. Hence, when Patrick
Henry exclaimed, "Give me liberty or give me death,"1 he really meant,
"Give me enough liberty for the reasonable protection of my human
dignity, or give me death."
Not only did this philosophy of an objective or higher natural law give
us a specific concept of liberty during the formative period, but it also
resulted in the doctrine of judicial supremacy." According to this doctrine,
the Supreme Court of the United States and the courts of last resort in the
respective states may void a legislative enactment, even though made by
the representatives of the people. The reason was that the Constitution of
the United States was regarded as implementing a higher law, which had
greater moral authority than even the will of the people. It was manifestly
intended by the framers of the Constitution that its meaning should be
interpreted in the light of higher laws.
II
The philosophy of an objective natural law was gradually superseded
by theories, as exemplified by the philosophy of Kant, which made individ-
ual liberty the basic moral starting point. 2 Hence, the Constitution was
no longer considered as the implementation of natural law. The authority,
See 1 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 510 (1959) [hereinafter cited as POUND].
'o See 1 W. HENRY, PATRICK HENRY 266 (1969) (from a speech delivered Mar. 22, 1775, in
support of his resolution to create a militia and put the colony of Virginia on a military
defense footing).
1 H. REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE-ITs AMERICAN PROPHETS 26-27 (1951) [hereinafter cited as
REUSCHLEIN].
1 See Brown, Natural Law and the Law-Making Function in American Jurisprudence, 15
NOTRE DAME LAW. 9, 12-17 (1939).
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which the courts exercised under the doctrine of judicial supremacy, began
to rest on a consensus of the wills of the justices themselves, as moved in
each case by their own philosophical predilections. They felt free to use
whatever philosophy of law would justify their personal views as to how the
case in question should be decided. By the end of the nineteenth century,
and during the first third of the twentieth, the courts were exalting individ-
ual liberty, with regard to property and contract, at the expense of the
common good. It will be recalled how much needed labor, and other social
legislation, was declared unconstitutional, on the grounds that individual
liberty must be constitutionally protected. 3
Thereafter, successful resistance to this erroneous balancing process
came from the sociological school of jurisprudence, so ably led by Roscoe
Pound." Individual liberty in the field of property and contract was finally
limited by giving proper weight to the common good of society, or to use
the amoral language of the sociological school, the social interest. This
began in the mid-1930's. President Roosevelt had unsuccessfully at-
tempted to pack the Supreme Court by appointing additional Justices
with a social legal philosophy." The same result was achieved, however,
by a voluntary change of legal philosophy within the Court itself.
But after the sociological school of jurisprudence had brought a social
consciousness to the thinking of the Supreme Court, and corrected its prior
imbalance between individual liberty and the common good with regard
to property rights, it then began to repeat the same mistake in the area of
personality. This may have been due, in part, to the indirect influence of
the sociological school. It had asserted that property interests were entitled
to less legal protection than personality interests in reference to the social
good." Hence, when the Court began to create a new imbalance on the level
of the asserted claims of personality, it parted company with both the
sociological school and the school of objective natural law, both of which
give considerable weight to the social claim, whether in the field of prop-
erty or personality.
It is submitted that an erroneous imbalance took place in at least five
historical antisocial cases within the past fourteen years, namely, Engel v.
Vitale 7 and Abington School District v. Schempp (the prayer cases);
Furman v. Georgia" (the capital punishment case); and Roe v. Wade'" and
'" See 1 POUND, supra note 9, at 437-50; Beard and Ellington, Prospects for Individual
Freedom: Toward Greater Fairness for All, 7 GA. L. REv. 410, 422 (1973).
1 1 POUND, supra note 9, at iii-xiii.
,1 See generally Olney, The President's Proposal to Add Six New Members to the Supreme
Court, 23 A.B.A.J. 237 (1937).
' See 3 POUND, supra note 9, at 327-34.
" 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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Doe v. Bolton,' (the abortion cases). It should be noted that none of these
cases was decided by a unanimous Court.
m
In Engel v. Vitale,2 the first "prayer case," decided by the Supreme
Court in 1962, the Regents of the New York public school system had
directed all teachers to lead the children each morning before school
started in the following affirmation: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our
dependence upon Thee and we beg Thy Blessing upon us, our parents, our
teachers, and our Country." In Abington School District v. Schempp, 3
decided by the Court a year later, the Lord's prayer and Bible reading were
required. In both cases, any student who did not wish to join in the affirma-
tion might stay in the classroom and remain silent, or leave the classroom
during the period in question.
The Court in both Engel and A bington declared that any prayer or
Bible reading requirement was prohibited by the first amendment estab-
lishment clause and was therefore unconstitutional. The insignificant rel-
evance of the establishment clause was admitted by Justice Black, author
of the majority opinion in Engel, who declared that the affirmation "seems
relatively insignificant when compared to the governmental encroach-
ments upon religion which were commonplace 200 years ago." 4 Another
member of the Engel majority, Justice Douglas, wrote that,
I cannot say that to authorize this prayer is to establish religion in the strictly
historic meaning of those words. A religion is not established in the usual
sense merely by letting those who choose to do so say the prayer that the
public school teacher leads.b
Hence, the real issue in the case related to the balance between the
individual liberty of the dissenting children to be free from any possible
coercion or embarrassment," and the need of society to have the state
strengthen the idea of the duty of obedience to a higher moral law. But to
have put the decision wholly on a freedom basis would have limited the
result in certain communities where homogeneity of moral view existed.27
In such communities, much litigation might have been necessary by dis-
senters .2
21 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
370 U.S. 421 (1962). See also Pollack, Foreword: Public Prayers in Public Schools, 77 HARv.
L. REv. 62 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Pollack].
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
370 U.S. at 436.
Id. at 442 (footnote omitted).
26 See Kenealy, The Proposed Prayer and Bible-Reading Amendments: Contrasting Views,
10 CATH. LAW. 185, 186-87 (1964).
' Pollack, supra note 21, at 70.
2Id.
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Surely, the demands of human dignity forbid the needless infliction
of embarrassment, but here the survival of a great necessary social postu-
late was at stake. If there was indirect coercion upon the dissenting chil-
dren, it would only be of secondary effect, and not strong enough to over-
come the need of society.
As discussed above, the most basic political, juridical and moral pos-
tulate of American society since the founding of the Republic has been the
duty of conformity to a higher law. Its inner core of values was unchallenge-
able, as stated in the Declaration of Independence. The outer aspect, hu-
manly created by the application of those central values, was changeable,
because of the changing minor premise of varying social and scientific
facts.21 It should have been realized by the Court that "dependence" in the
prayer affirmation meant the willingness to follow the standard of right
and wrong, divinely ordained, discoverable by the natural faculty of reason
and in conformity with the nature of man.
The area of liberty, therefore, which the Court accorded the dissenters
was not necessary to reserve any fundamental aspect of their dignity. No
central requirement of such dignity was protected by guaranteeing the
freedom of pantheists, agnostics, and atheists not to hear an anthropo-
morphic affirmation of the source of the higher law. Human dignity is not
offended when the higher law postulate is propagated because it is truth.
This is so although certain persons may deny it. There are still those who
believe that the world is flat. But the liberty to believe this does not
prevent the teaching of the contrary.
It was an historical accident that most of the American colonists were
Christians or Jews. But since they were, it was inevitable that their con-
cept of the higher or divine natural law should be a monistic one. Accept-
ance of the rational postulate of a higher law has been strengthened by its
inclusion as part of the Christian and Jewish religions, and there given the
additional authority of religious revelation. In this context, the higher law
was regarded as the enactment of a Divine Power, conceived of as the
Person Who had authored the revelation.
It is clear that acceptance of the higher law itself, regardless of its
origin or source, was the most fundamental postulate of the civilization
which generated the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights. It is true, of course, that not all of the Founding Fathers
were monists. Some were pantheists. But all who had any part in writing
the first amendment to the Constitution accepted this rational postulate,
despite their pluralism in the field of divine revelation.
The concept of a small, hard core of moral values, imposed by the
authority of a higher law, transcends all pluralism in any society, whether
that pluralism be religious, political, or philosophical. The common good
of every society demands the acceptance and implementation of these
See generally Brown, supra note 7.
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values. Certainly, the common good of society requires that the state be
neutral with reference to the supernatural aspects of the various religions.
But no state should be neutral with reference to the preservation and
promotion of the natural law which is discoverable through the natural
faculty of reason. Maximum tolerance must be shown to the supernatural
teachings of the great religions, but there should be no tolerance with
reference to fundamental natural law. Such tolerance or permissiveness
will result in the eventual collapse of any society.
The state must be neutral with reference to the supernatural teachings
of religion lest it interfere with the common good of a religiously pluralistic
society by creating dissension and divisiveness in matters which are not
related to the natural faculty of reason. It is true that the church and the
home should foster the concept of a divine natural law, but it is also the
duty of the state to make its very important contribution in this field.
The basis of morality may not be found in a mere social contract, or
a consensus, because morality could then be changed or disregarded by a
totalitarian state, or by a modem democracy with the consent of the major-
ity of the citizens.31 A strong assurance against governmental abuse can
come only from adherence to an unchallengeable scale of values, and not
simply to the will of the state. There must be an acknowledgement by the
state of the existence of a higher moral standard other than itself."'
With the decline of faith in all religions, including Christianity and
Judaism, the natural or higher law rational postulate lost an important
channel of support. Obviously, the New York Regents were attempting to
make up for this loss by having the state propagate this fundamental
postulate, so important for the continuation of our democratic way of life.
In Engel and Abington, the United States Supreme Court, however, frus-
trated this attempt. Was the weight given to the liberty of the dissenting
children and their parents justified? Certainly not, according to the philos-
ophy of the objective natural law.
It is gratifying to note that Justice Stewart dissented in the Engel and
Abington cases. In Engel he wrote: "[T]he history of the religious tradi-
tions of our people [is] reflected in the countless practices of our institu-
tions and officials of our government.""2 He declared that "to deny the wish
of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the
opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation."'' By "spirit-
ual heritage," he meant the heritage of the acceptance of the natural law
by all, and a Judeo-Christian idea of the source of that law by many.
It is submitted, therefore, that the situation in the prayer cases did
not affect the inner hard core of values of human dignity, which the dis-
30 Rice, Let Us Pray-An Amendment to the Constitution, 10 CATH. LAw. 178, 183 (1964).
31 Id.
32 370 U.S. at 446.
370 U.S. at 445.
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senting children had the right to have protected, and hence the social claim
should have been legally protected. Rather, the opportunity to make the
affirmation was conducive to that dignity because it recognized man's
obvious dependence upon the operation of eternal laws, geared to the na-
ture of each part of the universe, including rational life.
In the prayer cases, the Court used the doctrine of judicial supremacy
to declare unconstitutional an activity which would strengthen the concept
of natural law. It was repqdiating the philosophy of those who wrote the
Constitution, and the rationale behind the great constitutional decisions
of Marshall, Story, and many others in the formative period of the United
States.4 The words of a document like the Constitution take on a meaning
only insofar as they are interpreted within the framework of a specific
philosophy.
IV
In Furman v. Georgia,- the capital punishment case, one of the peti-
tioners, Furman, had been convicted of murder, and the two other peti-
tioners had been convicted of rape. In each instance, the jury, which had
been given the discretion to impose the death penalty, exercised that dis-
cretion in favor of that penalty. The Supreme Court held, in a 5-4 per
curiam opinion, "that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty
in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.""
The holding in Furman by the five Justices "did not purport to pro-
hibit, although it did not approve, a statute where the death penalty is
mandatory for a particular crime.""7 Regardless of the constitutionality of
more narrowly drawn death penalty statutes, it has been observed that the
Furman Court "has prohibited capital punishment in the overwhelming
majority of cases where it has previously been imposed for rape and murder
at the discretion of the jury."" It may be that "in addition, Furman may
contain the seeds, in the opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall, of a
complete proscription of the death penalty in the future. 38
The reasoning behind the decision was that it was cruel and unusual
punishment to allow a jury, after it had found an accused guilty of murder
or rape, to sentence him to either death or imprisonment. This was on the
apparent premise that capital punishment itself, however carried out, was
cruel and unusual. The illegality of one of the two choices left to the
discretion of a jury constitutionally voided the statute which attempted to
31 REuscHLEm, supra note 11, at 26-27.
- 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
" Id. at 239-40.
Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAiv. L. Rev. 62, 85 (1972).
39 Id.
n Id.
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confer the discretion. It is submitted that the real reason was to enlarge
the individual liberty of the convicted. For almost two hundred years the
words "cruel and unusual punishment" in the Constitution had meant
only such obviously unreasonable punishments as cutting off a man's hand
for theft, or crucifixion for murder or rape. Prior cases had interpreted the
eighth amendment as forbidding "torturous or barbaric penalties,"" or
cruel methods of carrying out a sentence of capital punishment.
The argument that capital punishment is cruel and unusual is clearly
specious. According to a natural law approach, a punishment is not cruel
and unusual when it is necessary to carry into effect the death penalty as
an essential protection of the common good, and when it is not used as an
end in itself, such as inflicting pain as a matter of revenge or sadism."
There must be a reasonable relation between the gravity of the crime and
the penalty imposed. The penalty should fit the crime as well as the crimi-
nal. Obviously, death would be an excessive punishment for offenses other
than murder, rape, or treason. It should also be understood that capital
punishment is justified only when the criminal in question has, beyond a
reasonable doubt, committed the crime with full knowledge that his act is
evil and antisocial. Likewise, the crime must be a great injustice against
the human dignity of the victim, as in murder or rape, or the life of a justly
ruling state, as in treason.
What weight is to be given to the values which are to be balanced in
the area of capital punishment? On one side of the scale is the freedom of
the convict not to forfeit his life. On the other is the right of society to have
the common good protected against the gross injustice which such crimes
as murder inflict. The formula is that the greater weight should be given
to the social claim as long as this does not deprive the individual of a
liberty which is absolutely indispensable for the preservation of his human
dignity. According to this formula, the scale should be tipped in favor of
the social interest.
The claim of society to protect itself by recourse to capital punishment
is not unreasonable. While it is not certain that capital punishment pro-
tects society by deterrence, the conclusion that it does is not unreasonable.
Life imprisonment may not be adequate as a punishment by society be-
cause it is common knowledge that sentences of life imprisonment are
seldom, if ever, fully served. Whether capital punishment protects society
by way of deterrence is a conclusion of fact, which cannot be resolved with
certainty. But the conclusion of the members of the forty legislatures in
the respective states who enacted the death penalty is surely not less valid
in this matter than that of the Justices of the Supreme Court." What
superior wisdom do judges have to reach the factual conclusion that capital
Id. at 81.
" T. DAvrrT, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, 218-21 (1959) [hereinafter cited as DAvrrr].
,2 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 385 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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punishment is not necessary as a deterrent, and as a definitive means of
permanently preventing a repetition of the crime?
Recourse to the death penalty by society does not deprive the convict
of any essential of his human dignity. The criminal has surrendered his
human dignity during the commission of his crime. The commission of a
grave crime, such as murder or rape, involves the self-inflicted degradation
of the criminal's human dignity, along with that of his innocent victim.
How does freedom from the fear of the death penalty enhance the essential
human dignity of a murderer or rapist, before, during, or after the commis-
sion of his crime? Indeed, it will aid him in his purposes for he will have
the certain knowledge that his own life is not in danger.
. The criminal is not morally or legally free to degrade human na-
ture-ditlier his own or that of another. He has forfeited his right to be
treated in every instance as if he had human dignity if society decides that
capital punishment is the only way in which it can protect itself.,3 The
common good is adversely affected when the individual inflicts a serious
wound upon his own human dignity or that of another because each indi-
vidual is related sociologically to every other individual within the unity
of society. In one sense, each is like a cell in the body social. The tainted
human dignity of an unjust aggressor has never been allowed to outweigh
the right of personal self-defense to protect life or limb. Nor has the mor-
ally impaired human dignity of persons killed while waging an unjust war
been held to outweigh the right of a state to wage a just war of self-
defense," except by a small percentage of pacifists. 5
The criterion to be followed, according to natural law doctrine, in
determining whether society should have recourse to the protection of capi-
tal punishment is objective, not subjective. The criterion is not the will of
the people, or the frequency or the infrequency of capital punishment, or
the subjective, philosophical preference of a particular justice. A law made
by a majority of the people, for example, that all persons, upon reaching
the age of one hundred, should be put to death by public authority because
this was necessary for the common good would not be binding. The human
dignity of these centenarians, never tainted by the commission of great
crime, would outweigh any economic advantage of society by their execu-
tion. But it would be otherwise in the case of the great criminal, whose
human dignity has been impaired by the permanent, irrevocable and irre-
versible results of his offense, with reference to himself and his victim. This
is so despite the religious necessity of forgiveness and possible rehabilita-
tion.
Finally, capital punishment serves such goals as giving the criminal
'3 DAVITr, supra note 41, at 221.
" See J. KEENAN & B. BROWN, CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW 66-71 (1950).
'5 Brown, supra note 4, at 85, 89-90.
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his due and reinforcing public morality."6 According to natural law philoso-
phy, crime is a great injustice, not only against society, but also against
the victim and his family. In addition to protecting society, therefore,
capital punishment vindicates the human dignity of the victim. It would
be vengeance for a member of the dead victim's family to give the convict
his due, but it becomes a matter of social justice when society inflicts the
death penalty.
V
The two abortion cases, Roe v. Wade 7 and Doe v. Bolton,"5 were de-
cided by the Supreme Court in 1973. In the former, a pregnant unmarried
woman sued on behalf of herself and all other women so situated to void
the Texas statute which forbade her an abortion. In the second case, a
married woman sued to void a Georgia statute which obliged her to con-
form to certain medical practices before she had a right to an abortion. In
each case, the Court declared the anti-abortion statute unconstitutional on
the ground that it violated the fourteenth amendment by a denial of liberty
and privacy without due process of law. In so doing, the Supreme Court
stretched the doctrine of due process to unprecedented lengths and im-
posed such limits upon permissible abortion legislation "that no abortion
law in the United States remained valid."'" The Court concluded that
patient and physician were free to end any pregnancy during the first
trimester without regulation by the state. The state may not interfere with
the liberty of the woman even to protect her health during this stage of
pregnancy.' State regulation, if any, is constitutionally permitted only at
the point of viability, i.e., "when a fetus can survive with artificial aid
outside the mother's body.""'
Here again, the Court balanced individual liberty, now extended
under the notion of privacy, to the detriment of the common good. The
Court made the same philosophical mistake it had made in the prayer and
capital punishment cases, and much earlier in the freedom of contract and
property cases. It started its judicial reasoning from the subultimate value
of liberty, which can have- no genuine judicial significance except as an
instrumental value to protect human dignity as necessary for the common
'6 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 444, 445, 452, 453 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing
the testimony of Lord Justice Denning before the British Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment).
47 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4" 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
11 Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tribe].
N Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). See Tribe, supra note 49, at 4.
" The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REv. 75, 78 (1973), citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
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good. In fact, the error was compounded by starting with privacy,5" a sub-
subultimate value.
In both Wade and Bolton, the liberty of a woman to destroy the fetus
at will was on one scale. On the other, was the common good of society,
requiring the protection of human life. Individual liberty was given such
weight in the balancing process as to deny the right of society to protect
what is now regarded by the best scientific evidence as human life. This
life starts with the zygote or first fertilized cell.
The growth of the embryo "has been traced in a continuous line from
a single unfertilized ovum through the unbroken processes of fertilization,
cell division, segmentation, implantation of the blastocyst in the uterine
wall, and gradual fetal development to the point of birth."5 It is manifest
that "the advance of embryology and medicine over the past century and
a half rendered untenable any notion that the fetus suddenly 'came to life'
in a physiological sense at a definable point during pregnancy."'"
In any event, "the recent scientific evidence about the humanity of the
zygote is enough to raise a reasonable doubt. . ."" which must be placed
on the scale. If present human life is not on the scale, with absolute cer-
tainty, it is at least possibly there, if not probably. The burden of proof is
upon those who claim that there is no possible human life during the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy.
It is obvious that abortion destroys something which otherwise could
have matured into a human being.5" But only human life can so mature.
May any Justice of the United States Supreme Court deny that at one time
he was a zygote? Would he have given his mother the constitutional right
to abort him during the first twelve weeks of her pregnancy?
How does the liberty to destroy what is now human life, or probably
human life, and in the due course of nature, certain human life, contribute
in any way to the safeguarding of the human dignity of the pregnant
women? The arbitrary killing of the unborn any time from the moment of
conception is an unnatural interference with an essential life function, and
hence a vitiation of human dignity. Is it not akin to the mutilation of an
important organ, or suicide? Liberty must not be allowed just for the sake
of liberty.
Is it any wonder that one of the dissenting Justices, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, wrote that "the disaster would have been less complete" had
the Court applied at least a traditional rationality standard. 5 Professor
Tribe has stated: "What makes Roe unusual, as Professor Ely rightly ob-
52 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
- Tribe, supra note 49, at 19-20.
Id. at 19. See also GRANnELD, THE ABOR ION DECISION 15-43 (1969).
Brown, Recent Statutes and the Crime of Abortion, 16 LoYoiA L. REv. 275, 285 (1970).
"Id.
31 Tribe, supra note 49, at 5.
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serves, is that, for reasons the Court never adequately explains, 'the liberty
involved is accorded a . . . stringent protection, so stringent that a desire
to preserve the fetus' existence is unable to overcome it.' ",68
In the abortion cases, the Court extracted the sub-subultimate right
of privacy from the subultimate right of liberty, and gave it such unprece-
dented weight that it may be balanced against the common good, conceiv-
ably, so as to legalize homosexual marriages, eliminate all legal restrictions
on what was formerly regarded as obscene conduct, and permit the free
sale and use of narcotics. 59 Sacrificed on the altar of privacy would be social
consciousness.
The alternative is either to repudiate liberty as the ultimate value or
accept the rule of physical force by some anti-democratic state form. The
social interest will sooner or later assert itself. The fixed pattern of human
nature ultimately demands and obtains a rational balance between the
aspiration to be free and the necessity of living in society."
Id. at 17.
See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HAIv. L. Rzv. 75, 83 (1973).
13 T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEo LoGICA, Question 90, at 3 et seq. (Blackfriars edition, E. Hill
transl. 1964). See B. BROWN, THE NAT RAL LAW READER 69 (1960).
